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LEARNING THE ERGODIC DECOMPOSITION
NABIL I. AL-NAJJAR AND ERAN SHMAYA
Abstract. A Bayesian agent learns about the structure of a stationary process from ob-
serving past outcomes. We prove that his predictions about the near future become ap-
proximately those he would have made if he knew the long run empirical frequencies of the
process.
1. Introduction
Consider a stationary, finite-valued stochastic process with probability law µ. According to
the ergodic theorem, an observer of this process can reconstruct the ‘true’ ergodic component
of the process from observing a single typical infinite realization. Decision problems, on the
other hand, are often concerned with making predictions based on finite past observations.
In such problems, the primary object of interest is the predictive distribution about the
outcome of the process at a given day given the finite history of outcomes from previous
days.
This paper relates these two perspectives on predictions and decisions. We consider the
long-run properties of an observer’s predictive distribution over next period’s outcome as
observations accumulate. We show that the predictive distribution becomes arbitrarily close
to the predictive distribution conditioned on knowledge of the true ergodic component, in
most periods almost surely. Thus, as data accumulates, an observer’s predictive distributions
based on finite history become the ‘correct’ predictions, in the sense of becoming nearly as
good as what he would have predicted given knowledge of the objective empirical frequencies
of the process. We demonstrate that the various qualifications we impose cannot be dropped.
Our results connect several literatures on learning and predictions in stochastic environ-
ments. First, there is the literature on the strong merging of opinions, pioneered by Blackwell
and Dubins [2].1 More directly relevant to our purpose are the weaker notions of merging in-
troduced by Kalai and Lehrer [9] and Lehrer and Smorodinsky [11], which focus on closeness
of near-horizon predictive distributions. While strong merging obtains only under stringent
assumptions, weak merging can be more easily satisfied. In our setting, for example, the
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posteriors may fail to strongly merge with the true parameter, no matter how much data
accumulates. This strong notion of merging is unnecessary in contexts where decision makers
discount the future or care only about a fixed number of future periods. Weak merging, to
which our results apply, is usually sufficient.
Another line of enquiry focuses on representations of the form µ =
∫
µθ dλ(θ), where a
probability measure µ (the law of the stochastic process) is expressed as a convex combina-
tion of distributions {µθ}θ∈Θ that may be viewed as especially “simple,” or “elementary.”
Such representations, also called decompositions, are useful in models of learning where the
set of parameters Θ may be viewed as the main object of learning. Two seminal theorems
are de Finetti’s representation of exchangeable distributions and the ergodic decomposition
theorem for stationary processes. Exchangeability rules out many interesting patterns of
inter-temporal correlation, so it is natural to consider the larger class of stationary distri-
butions. For this class, the canonical decomposition is in terms of the ergodic distributions.
This is the finest decomposition possible using parameters that are themselves stationary.
Our main theorem states that a Bayesian decision maker’s predictions, based on finite his-
tories, become arbitrarily close to those he would have made given knowledge of the true
ergodic component.
Our result should also be contrasted with Doob’s consistency theorem which states that
Bayesian posteriors weakly converge to the true parameter. When the focus is the quality
of decisions, what matters is not the agents’ belief about the true parameter but the quality
of his predictions. Although the two concepts are related, they are not the same. The
difference is seen in the following example from Jackson, Kalai and Smorodinsky [6, Example
5]: Assume that the outcomes Heads and Tails are generated by tossing a fair coin. If we take
the set of all dirac measures on infinite sequences of Heads-Tails outcomes as “parameters”,
then the posterior about the parameter converges weakly to a belief that is concentrated
on the true realization. On the other hand the agent’s predictions about next period’s
outcome is constant and never approach the predictions given the true “parameter.” This
example highlights that convergence of posterior beliefs to the true parameters may have
little relevance to an agent’s predictions and behavior.
Every process can be represented in an infinite number of ways, many of which, like
the decomposition of the coin toss process above, are not very sensible. Jackson, Kalai and
Smorodinsky [6] study the question of what makes a particular decomposition of a stochastic
process sensible. One requirement is for the process to be learnable, in the sense that an
agent’s predictions about near-horizon events become close to what he would have predicted
had he known the true parameter. Given the close connection between ergodic distributions
and long-run frequencies, the most natural decomposition µ =
∫
µθ dλ(θ) of a stationary
process is where the θ’s index the ergodic distributions. We show that their results do not
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apply to the class of stationary processes and their canonical ergodic decompositions. We
show, however, that the ergodic decomposition is learnable in a weaker, yet meaningful sense
as described below.
A third related literature, which traces to Cover [3], is non-Bayesian estimation of station-
ary processes. See Morvai and Weiss [13] and the reference therein. This literature looks
for an algorithm that make near-horizon predictions that are accurate for every stationary
process. Our proofs of Theorem 3.1 and Example 3.3 rely on techniques that were devel-
oped in this literature. There is however a major difference between that literature and our
work: We are interested in a specific algorithm, namely Bayesian updating. Our agent’s
predictions and behavior are derived from this updating process. We show how to apply the
mathematical apparatus developed for the non-Bayesian estimation in our Bayesian setup.
2. Formal model
2.1. Preliminaries. An agent (a decision maker, a player, or a statistician) observes a
stochastic process (ζ0, ζ1, ζ2, . . . ) that takes values in a finite set of outcomes A. Time is
indexed by n and the agent starts observing the process at n = 0. Let Ω = AN be the space
of realizations of the process, with generic element denoted ω = (a0, a1, . . .). Endow Ω with
the product topology and the induced Borel structure F . Let ∆(Ω) be the set of probability
distributions over Ω. The law of the process is an element µ of ∆(Ω). A standard way to
represent uncertainty about the process is in terms of an index set of “parameters:”
Definition 2.1. Let µ ∈ ∆(Ω). A decomposition of µ is a quadruple (Θ,B, λ, (µθ)) where:
(Θ,B, λ) is a standard probability space of parameters and µθ ∈ ∆(Ω) for every θ ∈ Θ such
that the map θ 7→ µθ(A) is B-measurable and
(1) µ(A) =
∫
Θ
µθ(A) λ(dθ)
for every A ∈ F . N
A decomposition captures a certain way in which a Bayesian agent arranges his beliefs:
The agent views the process as a two stages randomization. First a parameter θ is chosen
according to λ and then the outcomes are generated according to µθ. Beliefs can be repre-
sented in many ways. The two extreme decompositions are: (1) the Trivial Decomposition.
with Θ = {θ¯}, B is trivial, and µθ¯ = µ; and (2) the Dirac Decomposition. with Θ = A
N,
B = F , and λ = µ. A “parameter” in this case is just a Dirac measure δω that assigns
probability 1 to the realization ω.
We are interested in decompositions that identify “useful” patterns shared by many real-
izations. These patterns capture our intuition of fundamental properties of a process. The
two extreme cases are usually unsatisfactory. In the Dirac decomposition, there are as many
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parameters as there are realizations; parameters simply copy realizations. In the trivial
decomposition, there is a single parameter and thus cannot discriminate between different
interesting patterns.
Stationary beliefs admit a well-known decomposition with natural properties. Recall that
the set of stationary measures over Ω is convex and compact in the weak∗-topology. Its
extreme points are called ergodic beliefs. We denote the set of ergodic beliefs by E . Every
stationary belief µ admits a unique decomposition in which the parameter set is the set of
ergodic beliefs: µ =
∫
ν λ(dν) for some belief λ ∈ ∆(E). We call this decomposition the
ergodic decomposition.
According to the ergodic theorem, for every stationary belief µ and every block (a¯0, . . . , a¯k−1) ∈
Ak, the limit frequency
Π(ω; a¯0, . . . , a¯k−1) = lim
n→∞
1
n
#
{
0 ≤ t < n : at = a¯0, . . . , at+k−1 = a¯k−1
}
exists for µ-almost every realization ω = (a0, a1, . . . ). When µ is ergodic this limit equals
the probability µ([a¯0, . . . , a¯k−1]). Thus, for ergodic processes, the probability of every block
equals its (objective) empirical frequency.
The ergodic decomposition theorem states that for µ-almost every ω, The function Π(ω; ·)
defined over blocks can be extended to a stationary measure over ∆(Ω) which is also ergodic.
Moreover, µ =
∫
Π(ω; ·) µ(dω), so that the function ω → Π(ω; ·) recovers the ergodic
parameter from the realization of the process. Thus, the parameters µθ in the ergodic
decomposition represent the empirical distribution of finite sequences of outcome along the
realization of the stationary process. These parameters capture our intuition of fundamentals
of the process.
A special case of the ergodic decomposition is the decomposition of an exchangeable dis-
tribution µ via i.i.d. distributions. For future reference, consider the following example:
Example 2.2. The set of outcomes is A = {0, 1} and the agent’s belief is given by
µ (ζn = a0, . . . , ζn+k−1 = ak−1) =
1
(k + 1) ·
(
k
d
)
for every n, k ∈ N and a0, . . . , ak−1 ∈ A where d = a0 + · · ·+ ak−1. Thus, the agent believes
that if he observes the process k consecutive periods then the number d of good periods
(periods with outcome 1) is distributed uniformly in [0, k] and all configuration with d good
outcomes are equally likely.
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De-Finetti’s decomposition is given by (Θ,B, λ) where Θ = [0, 1] equipped with the stan-
dard Borel structure B and Lebesgue’s measure λ, and, for θ ∈ Θ µθ ∈ ∆(Ω) is the distribu-
tion of i.i.d coin tosses with probability of success θ:
µθ (ζn = a0, . . . , ζn+k−1 = ak) = θ
d(1− θ)k−d
N
2.2. Learning. For every µ ∈ ∆(Ω) and sequence (a0, . . . , an−1) ∈ A
n with positive µ-
probability, the n-period predictive distribution is the element µ(·|a0, . . . , an−1) ∈ ∆(A) rep-
resenting the agent’s prediction about next period’s outcomes given a prior µ and after
observing the first n outcomes of the process. Predictive distributions in this paper will
always refer to one-step ahead predictions. This is for expository simplicity; our analysis
covers any finite horizon.
Kalai and Lehrer [9], and Kalai, Lehrer and Smorodinsky [8] introduced the following
notions merging. Note that in our setup, where the set of outcomes is the same in every
period, this definition of merging is the same as ‘weak star merging’ in D’Aristotile, Diaconis
and Freedman [4].
Definition 2.3. Let µ, µ˜ ∈ ∆(Ω). Then the belief µ˜ merges to µ if
|µ˜(·|a0, . . . , an−1)− µ(·|a0, . . . , an−1)| −−−→
n→∞
0
for µ-almost every realization ω = (a0, a1, . . . ) ∈ A
N.
The belief µ˜ weakly merges to µ if
(2) |µ˜(·|a0, . . . , an−1)− µ(·|a0, . . . , an−1)|
s.c
−−−→
n→∞
0.2
for µ-almost every realization ω = (a0, a1, . . . ) ∈ A
N. N
Here and later, for every pair p, q ∈ ∆(A) we let ‖p − q‖ = maxa∈A |p[a] − q[a]|. These
definitions were inspired by Blackwell and Dubins idea of strong merging, which requires
that the prediction of µ˜ will be similar to the prediction of µ not just for the next period
but for the infinite horizon.
Definition 2.4. A decomposition (Θ,B, λ, (µθ)) of µ ∈ ∆(Ω) is learnable if µ merges with
µθ for λ-almost every θ. The decomposition is weakly learnable if µ weakly merges with µθ
for λ-almost every θ. N
2 A bounded sequence of real numbers a0, a1, . . . is said to strongly Cesaro converges to a real number a,
denoted an
s.c
−−−−→
n→∞
a, if limn→∞
1
n
∑n−1
k=0 |ak − a| = 0. Equivalently, an
s.c
−→ a if there exists a full density set
T ⊆ N such that limn→∞,n∈T an = a.
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As an example of a learnable decomposition, consider the Bayesian agent of Example 2.2.
In this case
µ(1|a0, . . . , an−1) =
a0 + · · ·+ an−1 + 1
n+ 1
.
For every θ ∈ [0, 1] the strong law of large numbers implies that for every parameter θ ∈ [0, 1]
this expression converges µθ-almost surely to θ. Therefore µ merges with µθ for every θ,
so De Finetti’s decomposition is learnable (and, a fortiori, weakly learnable). This is a
rare case in which the predictions µ(ζn ∈ ·|a0, . . . , an−1) and µθ(ζn ∈ ·|a0, . . . , an−1) can
be calculated explicitly. In general merging and weak merging are difficult to establish,
because the Bayesian prediction about the next period is a complicated expression which is
potentially depends on entire observed past.
2.3. Motivation for Weak Merging. In applications, µ represent the true process gener-
ating observations, and µ˜ is a Bayesian agent’s belief. To say that µ˜ weakly merges with µ
means that his next period predictions are accurate except for rare times.
To connect this concept with statistical decision problems, suppose that in every period,
before the outcome is realized, the agent has to take some decision from a finite set D. The
agent’s payoff is represented by the payoff function r : A ×D → [0, 1]. A strategy is given
by f :
⋃
n≥0A
n 7→ D, with f(a0, . . . , an−1) denoting the action taken given the past realized
outcomes. Let
VN(f) =
1
N
∫ N−1∑
n=0
r (an, f(a0, . . . , an−1)) dµ
be the expected average expected payoff in the first N periods. Fix ǫ > 0. A strategy f ∗
is ǫ-optimal for N periods under µ if VN(f) ≤ VN(f
∗) + ǫ for every strategy f . Of course
the optimal strategy depends on the agent’s belief µ. The following proposition, which is
immediate from the definition of weak learning, says that an agent who maximizes according
to a belief that weakly merges with the truth will play ǫ-optimal strategies against the truth
if he is sufficiently patient. By ‘sufficiently patient’ we mean that the horizon N is large.
Similar result applies if the agent aggregates periods’ payoffs using some discount factor
where by ‘sufficiently patient’ is meant that the discount factor is close to 1.
Proposition 2.5. Let µ˜, µ ∈ ∆(Ω) be such that µ˜ weakly merges with µ. For every ǫ > 0
there exists N0 such that for every N > N0, in every decision problem, every 0-optimal
strategy for N periods under µ˜ is ǫ-optimal for N periods under µ.
Kalai, Leher and Smorodinsky [8] provide a motivation for weak learning in terms of
the properties of calibration tests. The idea of calibration originated with Dawid [5]. A
calibration test of a forecast compares the predicted frequency of events to their realized
empirical frequencies. Kalai et al. showed that µ˜ weakly merges with µ if and only if
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forecasts made by µ˜ pass all calibration tests of a certain type when the outcomes are
generated according to µ.
Finally, Lehrer and Smorodinsky [12] provide a characterization of weak merging in terms
of the relative entropy between µ˜ and µ.3 No similar characterization is known for merging.
2.4. Merging and the Consistency of Bayesian Estimators. The idea of learning
captured by Definition 2.4 concerns the quality of predictions made about near-horizon
events. Another, perhaps more common, way to think about Bayesian inference is in terms
of the consistency of Bayesian estimator. Consistency can be thought of as concerning
learning the parameter itself. Recall that the Bayesian estimator of the parameter θ is
the agent’s conditional belief over θ after observing the outcomes of the process. It is well
known that under any ‘reasonable’ decomposition, the Bayesian estimator is consistent,
i.e., the estimator weakly converges to the Dirac measure over the true parameter as data
accumulates4. However, consistency of the estimator does not imply that the agent can use
what he has learned to make predictions about future outcomes. For example, consider the
Dirac decomposition of the process of fair coin tosses. Suppose the true parameter is ω∗ for
some ω∗ = (ω∗0, ω
∗
1, . . . ). After observing the first n outcomes of the process the agent’s belief
about the parameter is uniform over all ω that agrees with ω∗ on the first n coordinates.
While this belief indeed converges to δω∗ , the agent does not gain any new insight about
the future of the process from learning the parameter. This decomposition is therefore not
learnable.
3. Main Theorem
We are now in a position to state our main theorem.
Theorem 3.1. The ergodic decomposition of every stationary stochastic process is weakly
learnable.
To see the implications of our theorem, consider the following Hidden Markov process
Example 3.2. An agent believes that the state of the economy every period is a noisy
signal of an underlying “hidden” states that changes according to a Markov chain with
memory 1. Formally, let A = {B,G} be the set of outcomes, H = {B,G} the set of hidden
(unobserved) states, and (ξn, ζn) a (H×A)-valued stationary Markov process with transition
matrix ρ : H × A→ ∆(H × A) given by
ρ(h, a)[h′, a′] =
(
pδh,h′ + (1− p)(1− δh,h′)
)
·
(
qδh′,a′ + (1− q)(1− δh′,a′)
)
,
3 However, we do not know whether their condition can be used to prove our theorem without repeating the
whole argument.
4 The argument traces back to Doob. See, for example, Weizsacker [16] and the references therein. It holds
whenever the decomposition has the property that the realization of the process determines the parameter
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where 1/2 < p, q < 1. Thus, if the hidden state in period n was h then at period n + 1
the hidden state h′ remains h with probability p and changes with probability 1 − p. The
observed state a′ of period n + 1 will then be h′ with probability q and is different from h
with probability 1 − q. Let µp,q ∈ ∆(A
N) be the distribution of ζ0, ζ1, . . . . Then µp,q is a
stationary process which is not markov of any order. If the agent is uncertain about p, q
then his belief µ about the outcome process is again stationary, and can be represented by
some prior over the parameter set Θ = (1/2, 1] × (1/2, 1]. This decomposition of µ will be
the ergodic decomposition. N
The consistency of the Bayesian estimator for (p, q) implies that the conditional belief over
the parameter (p, q) converges almost surely in the weak-topology over ∆(Θ) to the belief
concentrated on the true parameter. However, because next-period’s predictions involve
complicated expressions that depend on the entire history of the process, it is not clear
whether these predictions merge with the truth. It follows from our theorem that they
weakly merge.
Consider now the general case. If the agent knew the fundamental θ, then at period n,
after observing the partial history (a0, . . . , an−1), his predictive probability that the next
period outcome is an would have been
(3)
µθ(a0, . . . , an−1, an)
µθ(a0, . . . , an−1)
.
Again consistency of the Bayesian estimator implies that, given uncertainty about the fun-
damental, the agent’s assessment of µθ(b) becomes asymptotically accurate for every block
b. However, when the agent has to compute the next-period posterior probability (3), he
only had one observation of a block of size n and no observation of the block of size n + 1
so at that stage his assessment of the probabilities that appear in (3) may be completely
wrong. Our theorem says that the agent would still weakly learn to make these predictions
correctly.
Theorem 3.1 states that the agent will make predictions about near-horizon events as if
he knew the fundamental of the process. Note, however, that it is not possible to ensure
that the agent will learn to predict long-run events correctly, no matter how much data
accumulates. For example, consider an agent who faces a sequence of i.i.d. coin tosses with
parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] representing the probability of Heads. Suppose this agent has a uniform
prior over [0,1]. This agent will eventually learn to predict near horizon outcomes as if he
knew the true parameter θ, but if he will continue to assign probability 0 to the event that
the long-run frequency is θ. In economic models, discounting implies that only near-horizon
events matter.
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We end this section with an example that in Theorem 3.1 weak learnability cannot be
replaced by learnability. The example is a modification of an example given by Ryabko for
the forward prediction problem in a non-Bayesian setup [14].
Example 3.3. Every period there is a probability 1/2 for eruption of war. If no war erupts
then the outcome is either bad economy or good economy and is a function of the number
of peaceful periods since the last war. The function from the number of peaceful periods to
outcome is an unknown parameter of the process, and the agent has a uniform prior over
this parameter.
Formally, let A = {W,B,G} be the set of outcomes. We define µ ∈ ∆(AN) through its
ergodic decompositions. Let Θ = {B,G}{1,2,...} be the set of parameters with the standard
Borel structure B and the uniform distribution λ. Thus, a parameter is a function θ :
{1, 2, . . . } → {B,G}. We can think about this belief as a hidden markov model where the
unobservable process ξ0, ξ1, . . . is the time that elapsed since last time a war occurred. Thus,
ξ0, ξ1, . . . is the N-valued stationary Markov process with transition probability
ρ(j|k) =


1/2, if j = k + 1,
1/2, if j = 0,
0, otherwise.
for every j, k ∈ N, and µθ is the distribution of a sequence ζ0, ζ1, . . . of A-valued random
variables such that
ζn =


W, if ξn = 0
θ(ξn), otherwise.
Consider a Bayesian agent who observes the process. After the first time a war erupts the
agent keeps track of the state of the process ξn at every period. If there is no uncertainty
about the parameter, i.e., if the Bayesian agent knew θ, his prediction about the next outcome
when ζn = k gives probability 1/2 to outcome W and probability 1/2 to outcome θ(k + 1).
On the other hand, if the agent does not know θ but believes that it is randomized according
to λ, he can deduce the values θ(k) gradually while he observes the process. However for
every k ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . } there will be a time when the agent will observe k consecutive peaceful
period for the first time and at this point the agent’s prediction about the next outcome
will be (1/2, 1/4, 1/4). Thus there will always be infinitely many occasions in which an
agent who predicts according to µ will differ than an agent who predicts according to µθ.
Therefore the decomposition is not learnable. On the other hand, in agreement with our
theorem, these occasions become more infrequent as time goes by so the decomposition is
weakly learnable. N
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4. Proof of Theorem 3.1
Up to now we assumed that the stochastic process starts at time n = 0. When working
stationary processes it is natural to extend the index set of the process from N to Z, i.e. to
assume that the process has infinite past. This is without loss of generality: every stationary
stochastic process ζ0, ζ1, . . . admits an extension . . . , ζ−1, ζ0, ζ1, . . . to the index set Z [10,
Lemma 10.2]. We therefore assume hereafter, with harmless contrast with our previous
notation, that Ω = AZ.
Let D be a σ-algebra Borel subsets of Ω. The quotient space of (Ω,F , µ) with respect to
D is the unique (up to isomorphism of measure spaces) standard probability space (Θ,B, λ)
and a measurable map α : Ω→ Θ such that D is generated by α, i.e., for every F -measurable
function f from Ω to some standard probability space there exists a (unique up to equality
λ-almost surely) B-measurable lifting f˜ defined over Θ such that f = f˜ ◦ α µ − a.s.. The
conditional distributions of µ over D is the unique (up to equality λ-almost surely) family
µθ of probability measures over (Ω,F , µ) such that:
(1) For every θ ∈ Θ it holds that
(4) µθ ({ω|α(ω) = θ}) = 1.
(2) The map θ 7→ µθ(A) is B-measurable and (1) is satisfied for every A ∈ F .
We call (Θ,B, λ, µθ) the decomposition of µ induced by D. For every belief µ ∈ ∆(Ω),
the trivial decomposition of µ is generated by the trivial sigma-algebra {∅,Ω}, the Dirac
decomposition is generated by the sigma-algebra of all Borel subsets of Ω. The ergodic
decomposition is induced by the σ-algebra I of all invariant Borel sets of Ω, i.e. all Borel
sets S ⊆ Ω such that S = T−1(S) where T : Ω→ Ω is the left shift.
We will prove a more general theorem, which may be interesting in its own right. Let
T : AZ → AZ be the left shift so that T (ω)n = ωn+1 for every n ∈ Z. A sigma-algebra D of
Borel subsets of Ω is shift-invariant if S ∈ D ↔ T (S) ∈ D for every Borel subset S of AZ.
Theorem 4.1. Let µ be a stationary distribution over Ω and let D be a shift invariant σ-
algebra of subsets of Ω such that D ⊆ F0−∞. Then the decomposition of µ induced by D is
weakly learnable.
Theorem 3.1 follows immediately from Theorem 4.1 since the sigma-algebra of invariant
sets I which induces the ergodic decomposition satisfies the assumption of the Theorem 4.1.
We will prove Theorem 4.1 using Lemma 4.2
Lemma 4.2. Let µ be a stationary distribution over AZ and let D be a shift invariant
σ-algebra of Borel subsets of AZ. Then
(5) ‖µ(ζn = ·|F
n
0 ∨ D)− µ(ζn = ·|F
n
−∞ ∨ D)‖
s.c
−−−→
n→∞
0 µ-a.s.
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Consider the case in which D = {∅,Ω} is trivial. Then Lemma 4.2 says that a Bayesian
agent who observes a stationary process from time n = 0 onwards will make predictions in
the long run as if he knew the infinite history of the process.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. For every n ≥ 0 let fn : Ω → ∆(A) be a version of the conditional
distribution of ζ0 according to µ given the finite history ζ−1, . . . , ζ−n and D:
fn = µ(ζ0 = ·|F
0
−n ∨ D),
and let f∞ : Ω→ ∆(A) be a version of the conditional distribution of ζ0 according to µ given
the infinite history ζ−1, . . . and D:
f∞ = µ(ζ0 = ·|F
0
−∞ ∨ D).
Let gn = ‖fn − f∞‖. By the martingale convergence theorem limn→∞ fn = f∞ µ-a.s and
therefore
(6) lim
n→∞
gn = 0 µ-a.s
It follows from the stationarity of µ and the fact that D is shift invariant that
(7) ‖µ (ζn = ·|F
n
0 ∨ D)− µ
(
ζn = ·|F
n
−∞ ∨ D
)
‖ = ‖fn ◦ T
n − f∞ ◦ T
n‖ = gn ◦ T
n µ-a.s
Therefore
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
‖µ (ζn = ·|F
n
0 ∨ D)− µ
(
ζn = ·|F
n
−∞ ∨ D
)
‖ =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
gn ◦ T
n −−−→
N→∞
0 µ-a.s
where the equality follows from (7) and the limit follows from (6) and Maker’s generalization
of the ergodic theorem [10, Corollary 10.8] to cover multiple functions simultaneously:
Maker’s Ergodic Theorem. Let µ ∈ ∆(Ω) be such that Tµ = µ and let g0, g1, · · · : Ω→ R
be such that supn |gn| ∈ L
1(µ) and gn → g∞ µ− a.s. Then
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
gn · T
n −−−→
N→∞
E(g∞|I) µ− a.s.

Proof of Theorem 4.1. From D ⊆ F0−∞ it follows that F
n
−∞ ∨ D = F
n
−∞. Therefore, from
Lemma 4.2 we get that
‖µ(ζn = ·|F
n
0 ∨ D)− µ(ζn = ·|F
n
−∞)‖
s.c
−−−→
n→∞
0 µ-a.s.
By the same lemma (with D trivial)
‖µ(ζn = ·|F
n
0 )− µ(ζn = ·|F
n
−∞)‖
s.c
−−−→
n→∞
0 µ-a.s.
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By the last two limits and the triangular inequality
(8) ‖µ(ζn = ·|F
n
0 )− µ(ζn = ·|F
n
0 ∨ D)‖ ≤
‖µ(ζn = ·|F
n
0 )− µ(ζn = ·|F
n
−∞)‖+ ‖µ(ζn = ·|F
n
0 ∨ D)− µ(ζn = ·|F
n
−∞)‖
s.c
−−−→
n→∞
0 µ-a.s
Let (Θ,B, λ) be the quotient of (Ω,F , µ) over D and let (µθ) be the corresponding conditional
distributions. Let S be the set of all realizations ω = (. . . , a−1, a0, a1, . . . ) such that
‖µ(ζn = ·|an−1, . . . , a0)− µω (ζn = ·|an−1, . . . , a0) ‖
s.c
−−−→
n→∞
0.
Then µ(S) = 1 by (8). But µ(S) =
∫
µθ(S)λ(dθ). It follows that µθ(S) = 1 for λ-almost
every θ, a desired. 
5. Ergodicity and mixing
Mixing conditions formalize the intuition that observing a sequence of outcomes of a
process does not change one’s belief about events in the far future. Standard examples
of mixing processes are i.i.d. processes and non-periodic markov processes. In this section
we recall a mixing condition that was called “sufficiency for prediction” in JKS, show that
the ergodic decomposition is not necessarily sufficient for prediction and show that a finer
decomposition than the ergodic decomposition is sufficient for prediction and also weakly
learnable.
Let
−→
T =
∧
m≥0 F
∞
m be the future tail sigma-algebra where F
∞
m the σ-algebra of Ω that
is generated by (ζm, ζm+1, . . . ). A probability distribution (not necessarily stationary) ν ∈
∆(Ω) is mixing if it is
−→
T -trivial, i.e., if ν(B) ∈ {0, 1} for every B ∈
−→
T .5
If we want the components of the decomposition to be mixing we need a finer decom-
position than the ergodic decomposition. This decomposition is the decomposition that is
induced by the tail
−→
T as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. Let (Θ,B, λ, (µθ)) be the decomposition of a belief µ ∈ ∆(Ω) that is induced
by the tail
−→
T . Then µθ is mixing for λ-almost every θ.
Proof. This proposition is JKS’ Theorem 1. We repeat the argument here to clarify a gap
in their proof.
The proposition follows from the fact that the conditional distributions of every probability
distribution µ ∈ ∆(Ω) over the tail are almost surely tail-trivial (i.e., mixing). This fact was
5 An equivalent way to write this condition is that for every n and ǫ, there is m such that
|ν(B|a0, . . . , an−1)− ν(B)| < ǫ
for every B ∈ F∞m and partial history (a0, . . . , an−1) ∈ A
n. JKS call such belief sufficient for prediction.
They establish the equivalence with the mixing condition in their proof of their Theorem 1
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recently proved by Berti and Rigo [1, Theorem 15]6. We note that it is not true for every
sigma-algebra D that the conditional distributions of µ over D are almost surely D-trivial.
This property is very intuitive (and indeed, easy to prove) when D is generated by a finite
partition, or more generally when D is countably generated, but the tail is not countably
generated, which is why Berti and Rigo’s result is required. 
The next theorem uses Lemma 4.2 to show that the tail decomposition is also weakly learn-
able. In particular, Theorem 5.2 implies that the ergodic decomposition does not capture
all the learnable properties of a stationary process.
Theorem 5.2. The tail decomposition of a stationary stochastic process is weakly learnable.
Proof. From Lemma 4.2 it follows that the decomposition induced by the past tail
←−
T is
learnable, since the past tail is shift invariant.
The theorem now follows from the fact that for every stationary belief µ over a finite set
of outcomes it holds that
←−
T µ =
−→
T µ where
←−
T µ and
−→
T µ are the completions of the past and
future tails under µ. See Weiss [15, Section 7]. Therefore, the decomposition of µ induced
by
−→
T equals the decomposition induced by
←−
T , which is learnable. We note that the equality
of the past and future tails of a stationary process is not trivial, it relies on finiteness of the
set of outcomes A, and the proof relies on the notion of entropy. 
We conclude with further comments on the relationship with [6]. Their main result char-
acterizes the class of distributions that admit a decomposition which is both learnable and
sufficient for prediction. They dub these processes “asymptotically reverse mixing.” In par-
ticular, they prove that, for every such process µ, the decomposition of µ induced by the
future tail is learnable and sufficient to prediction. In our Example 3.3, the tail decom-
position equals the ergodic decomposition, and, as we have shown, is not learnable. This
shows that stationary processes needs not be asymptotic reverse mixing. On the other hand,
the class of asymptotically reverse mixing processes contains non-stationary processes. For
example, the Dirac atomic measure δω is asymptotically reverse mixing for every realization
ω ∈ ∆(Ω).
6. Extensions
In this section we discuss to what extent the theorems and tools of this paper extend to a
larger class of process. In the process, this sheds further light on the assumptions made in
our work.
6 It is taken for granted in the first sentence of JKS’s proof of Their Theorem 1
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6.1. Infinite set of outcomes. The definitions of merging and weak merging can be ex-
tended to the case in which the outcome set A is a compact metric space7: Let φ be the
Prohorov Metric over ∆(A). Say that the belief µ˜ ∈ ∆(AN) merges to µ ∈ ∆(AN) if
φ (µ(·|a0, . . . , an−1), µ(·|a0, . . . , an−1)) −−−→
n→∞
0
for µ-almost every realization ω = (a0, a1, . . . ) ∈ A
N and that µ˜ weakly merges to µ if the
limit holds in strong Cesaro sense. Theorem 3.1 extends to the case of an infinite set A
of outcomes. However, Theorem 5.2 does not hold in this case. We used the finiteness in
the proof when we appealed to the equality of the past and future tails of the process. The
following example shows the problem where A is infinite:
Example 6.1. Let A = {0, 1}N equipped with the standard Borel structure. Thus an
element a ∈ A is given by a = (a[0], a[1], . . . ) where a[k] ∈ {0, 1} for every k ∈ N. Let µ
be the belief over AZ such that {ζn[0]}n∈Z are i.i.d. fair coin tosses and ζn[k] = ζn−k[0] for
every k ≥ 1. Note that in this case
−→
T = B (so the future tail contains the entire history of
the process) while
←−
T = R (the past tail is empty). The tail decomposition in this case will
be the Dirac decomposition. However, this decomposition is not learnable: an agent who
predict according to µ will at every period n will be completely in the dark about ζn+1[0]. N
6.2. Relaxing stationarity. As we have argued earlier, stationary beliefs are useful to
model situations where there is nothing remarkable about the point in time in which the
agent started to keep track of the processes (so other agents who start observing the process
at different times have the same beliefs) and that the agent is a passive observer who has
no impact on the process itself. The first assumption is rather strong, and can be somewhat
relaxed. In particular, consider a belief that is the posterior of some stationary prior condi-
tioned on the occurrence of some event. (A similar situation is an agent who observes a finite
state markov process that starts at a given state rather than the stationary distribution.) Let
us say that a belief ν ∈ AN is conditionally stationary if there exists some stationary belief
µ such that ν = µ(·|B) for some Borel subset B of AN with µ(B) > 0. While such processes
are not stationary, they still admits an ergodic decomposition. they exhibit the same tail
behavior of stationary processes. In particular, our theorems extend to such processes. The
obvious details are omitted.
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